The Arab spring was motivated by a number of factors. Rising unemployment, a disaffected population (especially amongst the educated youth), poverty, the respective governments’ poor record on human rights and government corruption all contributed to the Arab spring. An age of social networking also advanced the protests, enabling the protesters to organise and inspire others.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, another country shares the attributes that led to the Arab spring – Cuba. Cuba ticks all the boxes that lead to a disaffected population but has not experienced a revolution since that led by Fidel Castro. Reforms in early 2011 have removed many government subsidies and brought unemployment for many; hardly ingratiating the government with those Cubans already disaffected and those that expect the government to continue its paternalistic role.
An educated youth that cannot relate to what some older Cubans may consider as the halcyon days of the regime (largely contributed by the government being bankrolled by the Soviet Union), are also increasingly frustrated. Younger Cubans are disillusioned with modern day Cuba and while Cubans are restricted in using the internet, they are becoming increasingly worldly with the limited access they have. Add poor human rights and a ‘them and us’ perception of party officials into the mix and there’s little difference between Cuba and the Arab states that experienced protests and were forced into regime changes. So why is Cuba not ready for its own ‘Carib’ spring?
I previously wrote an article questioning the longevity of the Cuban revolution. Based on my experience in Cuba and the experiences of Cubans themselves, it was questionable how long the regime could survive without Fidel Castro at the helm. At the time, Fidel Castro’s ill health had not long become public knowledge. He had become notably absent from public life but was still President, even if not fully discharging his presidential duties. Now Castro has officially stepped down as President, only to be replaced by his brother Raul, the regime has seen some changes such as the reforms announced in early 2011. But fundamentally, little has changed to suggest a departure from life in Cuba under Fidel. Indeed, Fidel Castro in many ways personifies the revolution and despite any disdain for him from some Cubans, the regime is arguably more cohesive while he is still alive.
Modern day Cuba has China and Venezuela to replace the benefactor it once had in the Soviet Union. However, China is said to desire a similar approach for Cuba to that taken by its own government in moving towards a mixed economy. This might be reflected in the recent economic reforms but China will be keen to see more. The economic reform in Cuba under Raul Castro might be considered significant for Cuba but it’s not exactly a mixed economy.
Chinese and Venezuelan assistance in the Cuban economy prevents a bad situation from becoming worse. Take their assistance out of the equation and the consequent increased poverty and intolerable austerity measures would surely compel Cubans to revolt out of desperation more than anything else. So far, Cubans have not reached that level and Raul Castro will be conscious that financial support from the Chinese especially cannot be taken lightly. To assume subjecting Cubans to further poverty would not threaten the cohesiveness of the regime would be folly and naïve. Raul Castro will therefore be aware that the government cannot permit the economy worsening beyond current levels.
Further economic reform in Cuba is likely. Yet in the first instance it is likely to be out of obligation to further reduce the untenable role of the state within the Cuban economy or to satisfy Chinese desires.
As Cubans experience the impact of the economic reforms, they may develop an appetite for free market principles that the modest offerings of private enterprise are unable to satisfy. This will depend on the success of the economic reforms and the consequent standard of living for Cubans that embrace them.
Coupled with China advocating a mixed economy for Cuba, the economic reforms may unintentionally pave the way for concessions to be made. Should the government be unwilling to make such concessions as fast as Cubans desire, the reforms could even be a catalyst for vocal opposition towards the regime.
Unofficially, the Cuban economy already possessed many of the offerings that the economic reforms will bring. The black market in Cuba has long existed alongside the ‘official’ economy. Many Cubans have covertly embraced private enterprise and circumvented the state in their activities. The relaxation on buying and selling property and further sanctioning of small businesses now means the government can tax transactions in these areas which many Cubans are unlikely to appreciate. If the economic reforms put a squeeze on the black market, it will be met with indignation that could also lead to opposition towards the government.
Such scenes are nonetheless unlikely to be imminent and it is too early to assess the effect the economic reforms will have on Cubans.
Considering the similarities with the Arab spring, Cubans do have a disadvantage in their restricted use of the internet. The internet in Cuba is slow, expensive and inaccessible for most Cubans. The use of social networking sites to organise protests as seen in the Arab spring is therefore currently beyond Cubans. This limits their ability to mobilise meaningful and coordinated protests. Particularly given the stance of the Cuban authorities towards those that oppose the government, and in the context of Cuba’s record on human rights, safety in numbers is crucial for any uprising in Cuba.
The restrictions in using the internet also limit the global awareness of Cubans. Cubans largely rely on state run media and interaction with foreigners for an insight into the wider world and this has perhaps meant their ambitions are bridled by relative ignorance. That said, being able to make more money as a waiter than a doctor or other highly skilled profession, largely due to tips, makes it apparent to educated young Cubans especially that the status quo is unsatisfactory. Many young Cubans are also increasingly able to critique the regime with the increasing awareness they possess.
A significant distinction between the circumstances that led to the Arab spring and those in Cuba is the impact of the US embargo. While the traditional Cuban economic model has been proved to be unviable without foreign financial assistance, blame for Cuba’s economic woes cannot wholly be attributed to the regime.
The US embargo has had a tangible effect on Cuban society and the Cuban economy, most notably with the lack of food and medicine available in the country. The Cuban government needs little propaganda to illustrate the United States’ contribution to Cuba’s economic ills and commentators beyond the island condemn the embargo for the unjust impact it has on ordinary Cubans.
The embargo provides a convenient and somewhat justified opportunity to shift some blame for the social and economic problems in Cuba from Havana to Washington. In contrast to the Arab spring, the regime in Cuba is not wholly culpable and the Cuban government will be able to argue this as long as the embargo remains. Ironically, ending the embargo could therefore be more effective in threatening the cohesiveness of the regime than the embargo itself.
Cubans that speak candidly of their disdain for the regime express much of the frustration shown by protesters before the Arab spring. The hallmarks of dissatisfaction with the government are already apparent and have long been burgeoning amongst the Cuban population.
Speaking to younger Cubans especially, this disaffection and frustration is very evident. Like the Arab spring, any forced change in Cuba is likely to come from the educated Cuban youth. Unlike the older generation, they are too removed from the revolution led by Fidel Castro for nostalgia and blind support for the regime to compromise their outlook on the reality of life in Cuba.
Cuba appears an ideal candidate for anti-government protests on a widespread scale. But despite the parallels, Cuba faces further challenges in uprising than the Arab countries where the Arab spring took place. Nonetheless, frustration for the regime is growing within Cuba and while reform may be able to postpone further change, it cannot hold if off forever. And if the government decides against facilitating this, Cubans may eventually be compelled to demand it for themselves.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, another country shares the attributes that led to the Arab spring – Cuba. Cuba ticks all the boxes that lead to a disaffected population but has not experienced a revolution since that led by Fidel Castro. Reforms in early 2011 have removed many government subsidies and brought unemployment for many; hardly ingratiating the government with those Cubans already disaffected and those that expect the government to continue its paternalistic role.
An educated youth that cannot relate to what some older Cubans may consider as the halcyon days of the regime (largely contributed by the government being bankrolled by the Soviet Union), are also increasingly frustrated. Younger Cubans are disillusioned with modern day Cuba and while Cubans are restricted in using the internet, they are becoming increasingly worldly with the limited access they have. Add poor human rights and a ‘them and us’ perception of party officials into the mix and there’s little difference between Cuba and the Arab states that experienced protests and were forced into regime changes. So why is Cuba not ready for its own ‘Carib’ spring?
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Modern day Cuba has China and Venezuela to replace the benefactor it once had in the Soviet Union. However, China is said to desire a similar approach for Cuba to that taken by its own government in moving towards a mixed economy. This might be reflected in the recent economic reforms but China will be keen to see more. The economic reform in Cuba under Raul Castro might be considered significant for Cuba but it’s not exactly a mixed economy.
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As Cubans experience the impact of the economic reforms, they may develop an appetite for free market principles that the modest offerings of private enterprise are unable to satisfy. This will depend on the success of the economic reforms and the consequent standard of living for Cubans that embrace them.
Coupled with China advocating a mixed economy for Cuba, the economic reforms may unintentionally pave the way for concessions to be made. Should the government be unwilling to make such concessions as fast as Cubans desire, the reforms could even be a catalyst for vocal opposition towards the regime.
Unofficially, the Cuban economy already possessed many of the offerings that the economic reforms will bring. The black market in Cuba has long existed alongside the ‘official’ economy. Many Cubans have covertly embraced private enterprise and circumvented the state in their activities. The relaxation on buying and selling property and further sanctioning of small businesses now means the government can tax transactions in these areas which many Cubans are unlikely to appreciate. If the economic reforms put a squeeze on the black market, it will be met with indignation that could also lead to opposition towards the government.
Such scenes are nonetheless unlikely to be imminent and it is too early to assess the effect the economic reforms will have on Cubans.
Considering the similarities with the Arab spring, Cubans do have a disadvantage in their restricted use of the internet. The internet in Cuba is slow, expensive and inaccessible for most Cubans. The use of social networking sites to organise protests as seen in the Arab spring is therefore currently beyond Cubans. This limits their ability to mobilise meaningful and coordinated protests. Particularly given the stance of the Cuban authorities towards those that oppose the government, and in the context of Cuba’s record on human rights, safety in numbers is crucial for any uprising in Cuba.
The restrictions in using the internet also limit the global awareness of Cubans. Cubans largely rely on state run media and interaction with foreigners for an insight into the wider world and this has perhaps meant their ambitions are bridled by relative ignorance. That said, being able to make more money as a waiter than a doctor or other highly skilled profession, largely due to tips, makes it apparent to educated young Cubans especially that the status quo is unsatisfactory. Many young Cubans are also increasingly able to critique the regime with the increasing awareness they possess.
A significant distinction between the circumstances that led to the Arab spring and those in Cuba is the impact of the US embargo. While the traditional Cuban economic model has been proved to be unviable without foreign financial assistance, blame for Cuba’s economic woes cannot wholly be attributed to the regime.
The US embargo has had a tangible effect on Cuban society and the Cuban economy, most notably with the lack of food and medicine available in the country. The Cuban government needs little propaganda to illustrate the United States’ contribution to Cuba’s economic ills and commentators beyond the island condemn the embargo for the unjust impact it has on ordinary Cubans.
The embargo provides a convenient and somewhat justified opportunity to shift some blame for the social and economic problems in Cuba from Havana to Washington. In contrast to the Arab spring, the regime in Cuba is not wholly culpable and the Cuban government will be able to argue this as long as the embargo remains. Ironically, ending the embargo could therefore be more effective in threatening the cohesiveness of the regime than the embargo itself.
Cubans that speak candidly of their disdain for the regime express much of the frustration shown by protesters before the Arab spring. The hallmarks of dissatisfaction with the government are already apparent and have long been burgeoning amongst the Cuban population.
Speaking to younger Cubans especially, this disaffection and frustration is very evident. Like the Arab spring, any forced change in Cuba is likely to come from the educated Cuban youth. Unlike the older generation, they are too removed from the revolution led by Fidel Castro for nostalgia and blind support for the regime to compromise their outlook on the reality of life in Cuba.
Cuba appears an ideal candidate for anti-government protests on a widespread scale. But despite the parallels, Cuba faces further challenges in uprising than the Arab countries where the Arab spring took place. Nonetheless, frustration for the regime is growing within Cuba and while reform may be able to postpone further change, it cannot hold if off forever. And if the government decides against facilitating this, Cubans may eventually be compelled to demand it for themselves.